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Contemporary Jesuit Epistemological Interests 
 
James G. Murphy SJ1 
Associate Professor of Philosophy 
Loyola University Chicago 
 
 
Apart from an orientation to and interest in the discernment of spirits as laid out in St 
Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises, there does not exist a Jesuit epistemology as such. 
Compared to the numbers of Jesuit systematic theologians, scripture scholars, 
metaphysicians, and ethicists, there have been few Jesuit epistemologists.2 In 
metaphysics, Jesuits have been Thomist or Suarezian, even Platonist. In ethics, they have 
ranged from proportionalist through deontologist to virtue ethicist. No similar distinctive 
Jesuit presence is to be found in epistemology. 
     On the other hand, from its earliest years, the Society of Jesus has been committed to 
education, not just in theology and philosophy but also in the humanities and the 
sciences. That commitment has led it into wide engagement with different ways of 
knowing, to a diversity of interpretations of the world, human beings, and God. 
     Accordingly, the focus of this article is not Jesuit epistemologists as such, but 
epistemic aspects of Jesuit ventures: it attempts an overview of how Jesuits have grappled 
with issues of knowledge in theology, philosophy, and the sciences, roughly since the 
second Vatican Council (1962-65). It ranges across how they have viewed the epistemic 
status of experience and perception, the role of theory and interpretation, the appropriate 
                                               
1 Thanks to Stephen Schloesser SJ whose suggestions have greatly improved this paper. 
His ‘Jesuit Hybrids, Catholic Moderns, and Futural Pasts’, in For the City & the World: 
Conversations in Catholic Studies and Social Thought (Lane Center Lectures 2005-
2010), ed. Julia Dowd (University of San Francisco Press, 2010), pp. 114-141 gives a 
fascinating overview of aspects of the history of Jesuit scholarship. Thanks also to Gerry 
O’Hanlon SJ and Conall O Cuinn for helpful criticism. 
2 Bernard Lonergan,Vincent Potter, and Patrick Heelan are among the notable few. 
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ways to link theology and the sciences, the nature and sources of moral knowledge, the 
role of the Spiritual Exercises and particularly the discernment of spirits as an epistemic 
guide to spiritual wisdom, the importance of judgment leading to commitment to action, 
and the cognitive potential of different religions and cultures. 
 
HUMANISM: ALESSANDRO VALIGNANO SJ vs. POPE BENEDICT XIV 
Traditional and pre-Vatican II Catholic theology and philosophy in which the Jesuits, like 
other Catholic clerics, would have been trained, tended to be based on premises from 
scholastic philosophy that were heavily a priori, or derived from the authority of 
Scripture and magisterium. While critics at the time and subsequently saw scholastic 
philosophy and ecclesial authority as objectionable, the real problem was the apparent 
rejection of, or perhaps more precisely, the attempt to limit and control science and 
experience. 
     From the foundation of the Society of Jesus in 1540 to its suppression in 1773, and 
again from its restoration in 1814 to Vatican II (1962-65), its members had a well-worked 
out philosophy (usually Thomist or Suarezian) and were thoroughly grounded in post-
Tridentine systematic theology. Few theological uncertainties were to be found among 
them; and, epistemologically, certainty was a virtue in that era. At the same time, their 
strong faith-commitment and conviction that the Christian Church was the indispensable 
means to salvation made them strongly missionary, leading them to bring the gospel to 
the peoples of Asia and the Americas. However, in fulfilling that mission, they were also 
humanist. Their Renaissance-based humanism led their missionary zeal to take seriously 
the language and cultures of the peoples they sought to evangelize, a stance most 
associated with Alessandro Valignano SJ (1539-1606). They did not just seek to ‘know’ 
those peoples, in the sense of knowledge as acquaintance; they also sought to understand 
how different peoples interpreted the world. In short: their knowing of their target people 
and intended converts came to involve cognitively embracing their culture, which 
included knowing how those people knew and interpreted their experience. 
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     A significant instance was the Jesuit missionary project in China from 1600 to 1773.3 
As early as Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), the Jesuits interested themselves in Confucianism, 
as a natural quasi-religion. They also took Chinese culture seriously in a way that many 
of their European contemporaries did not. The contrast in that period between the Jesuit 
and the Franciscan approaches to evangelizing the Chinese is vivid testimony to Jesuit 
humanism. This divergence in culture distanced the Jesuits from the dominant Roman 
view, leading to the clash between Rome and the Jesuits in the Chinese rites controversy. 
The fact that the pope who finally decided the issue was Benedict XIV (1740-58), 
perhaps the most enlightened pope between the Council of Trent (1545-63) and Vatican 
II, indicates the depth and seriousness of the clash: it was no mere misunderstanding.4  
     The clash over rites and religion reveals an underlying epistemological divergence. 
The Jesuits believed there was important knowledge to be had through immersing 
themselves in Chinese culture, partly because some of it would probably lead them to 
discover how to mediate Jesus Christ to Chinese culture, and partly because Chinese 
culture seemed of value for its own sake as a way of interpreting experience, the world, 
and human nature. Their opponents deemed such inculturation unsound, thinking non-
Christian ideas would dilute the gospel message, making it harder for the Chinese (and 
the Jesuits themselves) to know who Christ was and where he was to be found. They 
judged that the results of such inculturation could not possibly be epistemologically 
authoritative: it was bad enough for the Jesuits to argue that inculturation was good, it 
was worse to suggest that it was necessary to the point that the gospel could not be 
communicated to the Chinese except through Chinese culture. 
 
VATICAN II: SIGNS OF THE TIMES 
The conventional view of Vatican II is that it was an ‘opening-up’ moment for the 
Catholic Church. From a condemnatory mode of rhetoric going back to the 16th century 
                                               
3 The Jesuits didn’t confine themselves to “high” culture. In the 17th century, they also 
studied the cultures of North American natives, as the multivolume Jesuit Relations 
shows. For important papers on these topics, see John W. O’Malley et al, eds, The 
Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773 (University of Toronto Press, 1999).  
4 In 1939, as war with Japan engulfed China, the newly-elected Pope Pius XII rescinded 
the ban on the Chinese rites. 
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Council of Trent, continued and heightened from 1815 to the 1950s, and a generally 
fearful and defensive stance towards the modern world, the Catholic Church suddenly 
began to express a cautious openness, even a willingness to listen and learn.  
     The view that Vatican II represents a revolutionary moment for the Catholic Church 
is, no doubt, rather crude in its sweeping generalization, but it has sufficient accuracy to 
let it stand. As Vatican II recedes into the past, historians are increasingly able to discern 
the continuities with previous developments, such as Pius XII’s opening doors to 
Catholic scripture scholarship and liturgical reform. 
     At the time, it was amazing to hear an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church, not 
merely accept the principle of freedom of religion, but also commence its document 
about the Church’s stance towards the modern world as follows: ‘The joys and the hopes, 
the griefs and the anxieties of the people of this age … are the joys and hopes, the griefs 
and anxieties of the followers of Christ’. It continues: ‘the Church has always had the 
duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the 
Gospel. Thus, in language intelligible to each generation, she can respond to the perennial 
questions which people ask about this present life and the life to come...  We must 
therefore recognize and understand the world in which we live, its explanations, its 
longings, and its often dramatic characteristics … True, there is a growing exchange of 
ideas, but the very words by which key concepts are expressed take on quite different 
meanings in diverse ideological systems’.5 Such a note had never been struck before in 
official Church documents, not because the pre-Vatican II Church had been opposed to 
such ideas but because it hadn’t thought them important. 
     Where the Church had seen its role as that of handing on the message of Christ, 
presenting and teaching Catholic doctrine clearly and precisely, it now seemed to want to 
listen also: it was not abandoning its traditional role, but it was also expressing a novel 
epistemological openness. The novelty lay not in prelates and priests being open to new 
ideas and insights, but in their taking such openness to be of value for its own sake: first, 
as an intellectual, cognitive or epistemic virtue and second, as directly relevant to 
effective evangelization and communication of the Christian faith.  
                                               
5 See http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html: Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, nn. 1 and 4. 
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      In the extract quoted from Gaudium et Spes, the points of epistemological interest 
include (i) the claim that anything belonging to the range of human experience or interest 
is relevant to understanding the Christian message, so must be cognitively appropriated 
by the Church, (ii) the requirement that the Church identify and interpret ‘the signs of the 
times’, (iii) the importance of being receptive to the questions and concerns of the people 
of the age, and (iv) the difficulty of understanding where humanity is situated on its 
historical journey, given major cultural change, technological revolution, ideological 
clashes, and even shifts in linguistic and conceptual meaning.6  
 
VATICAN II: STABLE TRUTH, DEVELOPING TEACHING 
From an epistemological perspective, the most significant moment at Vatican II may 
have come in Pope John XXIII’s opening address to the council. The pope, probably 
reflecting the influence of the nouvelle theologie or ressourcement theology of de Lubac, 
Congar, Chenu, Rahner, and Balthasar, created space for fresh inquiry and new insights 
by stating: ‘The deposit or the truths of faith .. are one thing, while the mode in which 
they are enunciated, keeping the same meaning and the same judgment, is another’.7 No 
truths of faith would be denied or rejected. But new formulations could be developed for 
those truths, fresh interpretations were to be encouraged, traditional truths could be 
deepened or further elaborated, and maybe new truths emerge. 
     The pope’s comment illustrates something important about human cognition. 
Epistemological concern is not confined to coming to know new things or recognize 
previous. It also embraces (a) exploration of what we know in part, since most knowledge 
is partial, (b) deeper understanding of what is already known to be true, (c) application of 
what we know to situations not hitherto encountered, with the result that we may 
                                               
6 It is doubtful if many bishops at Vatican II had read Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962), published the year the council 
assembled. But the views expressed in the passage quoted from Gaudium et Spes reflect a 
similar sense of cultural and semantic transformations. 
7 John XXIII, Opening address to Vatican II, n 6: ‘Est enim aliud ipsum depositum Fidei, 
seu veritates .. aliud modus, quo eaedem enuntiantur, eodem tamen sensu eademque 
sententia’. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/speeches/1962/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_spe_19621011_opening-council_lt.html 
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understand that truth in new ways, and (d) translation of the language within which the 
truth is expressed into other formulations. 
 
JESUITS BEFORE VATICAN II: NEW PATHS TO THEOLOGY  
The change at Vatican II had been in the making since the 1920s, and Jesuits had been 
prominent among its makers. To describe what they contributed would take several 
books; here I merely point to the epistemological dimensions.   
     Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was a palaeontologist and cosmologist who, influenced by 
Henri Bergson’s L’Évolution Créatrice, grappled with the challenge that evolution 
appeared to present, not directly to formal Catholic doctrine, but more to the general 
network of ideas and concepts that made up Catholic tradition(s) on anthropology. By the 
late 1930s, he was in trouble with Church authorities for his openness to Darwinian 
theories of evolution, who did not share his sense of the importance of approaching the 
evolutionary aspects of anthropology scientifically. Given the importance of evolution, 
however, somebody had to knock forcefully on the Church’s door, even though it might 
produce a “Shoot-the-messenger” reaction. Teilhard stood in a long Jesuit tradition of 
openness to new knowledge in knocking loudly, and in accepting the personal sacrifices 
involved in remaining faithful to science. 
     Henri de Lubac SJ ’s Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogme (Paris 1938) was 
significant in proposing the Fathers of the early Church, rather than the medieval 
scholastics, as offering a more fruitful epistemological model for developing an up-to-
date theology. His later work promoted this essentially epistemological ‘ressourcement’ 
and was influential at Vatican II. 
     In the years after Vatican II the term ‘theological reflection’ was often heard. In many 
theologates, students were encouraged, not simply to learn the tradition and familiarize 
themselves with the Church’s doctrines, but also to ‘do’ theology themselves. Professors 
bred under the older scholastic system would have wondered if this notion was not 
merely an empty rhetorical flourish. However, the ressourcement movement could point 
to the Fathers as providing but an example of theological praxis, since they were bishops 
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and pastors developing theological thought in response to pastoral need. They modeled 
how to do theology, in a way responsive to the concerns of the people of their times.8 
     In the 1930s, Karl Rahner’s doctoral dissertation treated epistemological issues in 
Thomas Aquinas from a perspective influenced by Kant, Heidegger, and another Jesuit, 
Joseph Maréchal. His dissertation-director Martin Honecker judged it unacceptably 
Heideggerian.  
     In the 1930s and 1940s, Jesuits such as the Frenchmen de Lubac and Yves de 
Montcheuil and the German Alfred Delp, all involved in active resistance to the Nazi 
regime, became keenly aware of the social and political dimensions of human existence 
as sources of knowledge for a more adequate theological anthropology. Montcheuil was 
influenced by Maurice Blondel’s focus on the primacy of action, and on what might be 
called the importance of knowing-by-doing. Scholastic philosophy’s notion of experience 
was increasingly seen as too narrowly Aristotelian or Humean in its focus on sense-data. 
Montcheuil and Delp died at the hands of the Nazi regime, but Jesuits (like de Lubac) 
who survived had been transformed, almost overwhelmed, by their experience, and pre-
Kantian categories seemed quite inadequate to the experience of war, occupation, and 
genocide. They meant something quite new in the Catholic theological tradition when 
they argued that theology must arise from lived experience.  
      
JESUIT MISSIONS: ATHEISM 
Vatican II called on religious orders to renew themselves in line with their founder’s 
charism. The Society of Jesus duly made a start at its 31st General Congregation (1965-
66).9 In his opening address to the Jesuits assembled for GC 31, Pope Paul VI asked the 
Society to tackle the distinctively modern phenomenon of atheism. Distinguishing 
between the state atheism of contemporary Communist states, philosophical atheism, and 
                                               
8 In reading de Lubac and the others, we are most aware of their criticisms of standard 
theological and philosophical positions; but in historical perspective, we see the 
continuities between them and the scholastics. Furthermore, intellectual and cultural 
contexts change: in some, the scholastic systematic approach might be precisely what is 
needed. 
9 From here, I abbreviate ‘General Congregation’ to ‘GC’, followed by the congregation 
number.  
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what he called ‘hedonistic’ atheism, he called on Jesuits to study atheism seriously and 
systematically.10 It wasn’t like being asked to combat Protestantism or heresy, where the 
issue was to clarify Christian doctrine and defend the orthodox variant of it, for atheism 
was not a doctrine that defined a particular group.  
     In their response, Decree 3 of the GC 31 documents, the Jesuits showed that they 
understood that it also involved seeking to understand modern atheism, that the view of it 
current before Vatican II was dated and inadequate, and that acquiring understanding 
required significant dialogue with atheists.11 The sources of atheism appeared to be 
many: ideological Marxism, a kind of materialism encouraged by the rise in material 
wellbeing, simple de-Christianization in older Christian countries such as France, and the 
Church’s frequent support of ultra-conservative causes and perceived hostility to modern 
culture and modern science. 
     Like the Church, the Society of Jesus in the 1960s was changing its response to the 
world. The traditional approach would have taken an ontological stance on the facts: the 
facts are that atheism is irrational and false, since its anthropology is mistaken on several 
major points, so let that be reiterated firmly. Now came a shift of emphasis to an 
epistemological stance: (a) If atheism could be understood, it could be more effectively 
countered and defeated; (b) Acquiring that understanding is not just a matter of 
identifying false philosophical theses, but also exploring why modern people are drawn 
to it; (c) Doing this requires culturally wider and more open-minded engagement. 
     The next step, unacknowledged because not fully realized in 1965, was: (d) Such 
engagement with atheism could shift Jesuit goals from opposing atheism to clarifying it, 
dialoguing with it, and living with it. Atheism as an ideological or philosophical 
movement would probably be around for reasons that the cultural historian would be 
better placed to address than the philosopher, so refuting atheism, while important, was 
not as overridingly important as might have been thought. Atheists, agnostics and the 
indifferent were persons whose need called Jesuits to walk with them.  
                                               
10 See John W. Padberg, ed. Jesuit Life and Mission Today: The Decrees and 
Accompanying Documents of the 31st-35th General Congregations of the Society of Jesus. 
(St Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2009), p. 231. 
11 GC 31, nn. 24-30, in Padberg 2009, pp. 53-56.  
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     In any case, winning arguments was relevant only to atheism of the doctrinaire kind, 
which did not flourish in the post-1965 era. Academic Jesuit philosophers or theologians 
did occasionally engage in well-publicized debates with unbelievers. In 1948, English 
Jesuit Frederick Copleston, author of a famous multi-volume history of philosophy, 
debated Bertrand Russell on BBC radio, and from the 1950s to the 1970s Jesuits could be 
found at academic conferences with such Marxists as Roger Garaudy.  
     Since about 2000, the challenge from what have been labeled the ‘New Atheism’ 
(with Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and even Stephen Hawking falling under this 
label) has appealed to science as an epistemic authority that proves religion to be false 
and God not to exist. In some ways, the New Atheism is quaintly old-fashioned, harking 
back to Enlightenment ideas about the universal scope of science and instrumental 
reason. Jesuits have been involved in responding to the critique. Some have argued that 
various developments relating to what astrophysicists sometimes term the ‘fine-tuning’ of 
the universe support or at least show the theist stance as not unreasonable and no more 
implausible than the atheist stance.12 In that respect, the Jesuit response was one with 
long roots in Jesuit history, going back to the Society of Jesus’s early engagement with 
science through such Jesuit contemporaries of Galileo as Kristoph Klau (Christopher 
Clavius), who developed the Gregorian calendar still in use, and in the age of the 
Enlightenment through Jesuits such as Rudijer Boscovic.  
     Others have focused on highlighting the epistemological distinctions between the 
sciences, metaphysics, and theology, making the case for the position that the science-
religion clash is something of a mirage.13 They have also drawn attention to the 
importance of disciplinary boundaries within science, noting the difficulty of identifying 
what scientific method is, and effectively queried the supposition that there is such a 
thing as ‘science’ as distinct from particular sciences. Modern philosophers, including the 
                                               
12 See Robert J. Spitzer, New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of 
Contemporary Physics and Philosophy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2010). See 
also George Coyne and Michael Heller, A Comprehensible Universe: The Interplay of 
Science and Theology (Springer, 2008); Guy Consolmagno, ed., The Heavens Proclaim: 
Astronomy and the Vatican (Vatican Observatory Publications, 2009). 
13 See Séamus Murphy 2007, ‘Science vs. Religion: The Phony War’. Studies, Irish 
Jesuit Quarterly 96 (2007): 245-256. 
 10 
logical positivists, Husserl and the phenomenologists, and Heidegger have recognized the 
epistemological significance of the fact that the sciences differ among themselves both 
with respect to the entities they treat and with respect to their methodologies.14  
     The relationship between the sciences and theology remains a significant issue for 
Jesuit engagement with contemporary scientific and philosophical culture. In the ongoing 
multiplication of disciplinary specialization and the increased divergence of those 
disciplines, Jesuits sense a challenge to the Renaissance humanist view of the unity of 
knowledge and seek in their universities to respond to that.15 
 
JUSTICE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY ISSUES 
GC 32 (1974-75) was momentous principally for two reasons.   
     First, the Congregation committed itself to the proposition that the promotion of 
justice is an ‘absolute requirement of’ or ‘integral to’ the service of faith. Social justice 
was clearly uppermost in the minds of the delegates, even if the justice that is integral to 
the service of faith is necessarily broader than social justice.16 Referring to Paul VI’s 
mission to the Society of Jesus of combating atheism, GC 32 expressed the sense that 
social injustice, often global in extent, sometimes structural and state-sponsored in nature, 
both reflected and reinforced a kind of practical atheism.17 While it was easy enough to 
find Scriptural and patristic support for that claim, what was striking was the change in 
emphasis: the Jesuits had come quite a distance in their interpretation of the world since 
1965 when their talk about atheism seemed primarily concerned with the ideas of people 
such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Nikita Khruschchev.18 Now their judgment was that the 
                                               
14 The most famous Jesuit epistemologist of the 20th century was Bernard Lonergan 
(1904-84), whose two major works, Insight (Longmans, 1957) and Method in Theology 
(Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972) direct attention to these issues, notably in his 
discussion of functional specialties. 
15 See, for example, http://www.luc.edu/mission/index.shtml for Loyola University 
Chicago’s mission statement, in particular the document ‘Transformative Education’. 
16 See Séamus Murphy, ‘The Many Ways of Justice.’ Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits 
26/2 (1994). 
17 GC 32, nn. 76-79; in Padberg 2009, p. 305. 
18 It would be easy to retort that Jesuits had been well aware of social injustice long 
before the early 1970s, and point to Fr General Janssens’ document on the social 
apostolate of 1948 as well as to social initiatives undertaken by Jesuits in those years, 
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spread of atheism had more to do with social structures and mass culture than with 
philosophical ideas. 
     A Jesuit who was particularly influential both as catalyst and as non-academic 
synthesizer of these disparate trends in the Society of Jesus in the early 1970s was the 
Jesuit general, Fr Pedro Arrupe. He had survived the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima 
and, along with Jesuits who had been marked by their war-time experiences, seemed 
striking proof of the epistemic authority of experience, particularly extreme social 
experience, as distinct from (and in some sense trumping) the authority of academic 
theology and philosophy.19 Fr Arrupe communicated to young Jesuits in a way that no 
previous or subsequent Jesuit general (except Ignatius) has matched, and his addresses 
seemed to suggest that knowledge without social commitment was without value.20 
     It is not surprising that the ‘we-need-to-learn’ note was struck more strongly at GC 32 
than at GC 31. GC 32 admitted: ‘Too often we are insulated from any real contact with 
unbelief and with the hard, everyday consequences of injustice and oppression’.21 
Accordingly, it called for greater experiential learning through insertion into the lives of 
the poor and marginalized. In response, a number of Jesuits undertook initiatives in this 
direction with varying degrees of success.   
     In order to understand the nature of oppressive social structures that should be 
transformed in the interest of human liberation, GC 32 also directed Jesuits’ attention to 
the social sciences.22 Liberation theology had emerged in Latin America a few years 
earlier, and its popular slogan was that theology should be done with the Bible in one 
hand and the newspaper in the other. Among Latin American liberation theologians and 
European political theologians it was widely held that theology’s privileged dialogue 
partner should be sociology or economics, not philosophy. 
                                               
such as the Latin American Jesuit educational movement Fe y Alegría founded in the 
1950s by Fr José Maria Vélaz SJ. What was novel was that the experience of social 
injustice was now beginning to change their thinking about what evangelization meant. 
19 As one commentator put it later, late 20th century people (including Jesuits) rejected the 
experience of authority in favour of the authority of experience. 
20 I owe this point to Steve Schloesser. 
21 GC 32, nn. 84, 96-99; in Padberg 2009, pp. 306-310. It was also struck at GC 34 in its 
document on women in Church and society; see GC 34, n. 372, in Padberg 2009, p. 618. 
22 GC 32, nn. 84, 93; in Padberg 2009, pp. 307-8. 
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     At the same time, GC 32 noted a crisis in Jesuit attitudes to philosophy, and perhaps to 
reason in general: ‘From different parts of the Society it has been reported that 
philosophical studies in recent hears have suffered deterioration’.23 In some respects and 
in much of the Society of Jesus in the late 1960s, philosophy had ‘lost its way’: in the 
post-Vatican II years, theology was in a state of ferment and excitement, having liberated 
itself from the scholastic philosophy that had supported – and constrained – it up to 
Vatican II. No doubt that meant many Jesuit philosophers were out of work, but the 
deeper issue was that with respect to philosophical foundations Jesuit theologians and 
Jesuits in general were adrift. One response was that philosophy could be replaced by the 
social sciences. A number of Jesuits were directed towards studies in sociology. Forty 
years later the outcome of that commitment suggests that the Jesuits involved were not 
quite sure what to do with sociology in order to transform their theological understanding 
of their corporate ministry. 
     It gradually became clear that if theology was to be connected fruitfully with the 
social sciences philosophy was indispensable. Drawing attention to the fact that 
economics and sociology were empirical disciplines while theology was not, Francisco 
Ivern SJ warned of the danger of giving a theological stamp of approval to a particular 
economic theory (e.g. dependency theory, widely influential on the thinking of liberation 
theologians in the 1970s) or of claiming a quasi-scientific status for one particular 
theological approach (such as liberation theology).24 His point was that valid linkage of 
theology with any science required philosophy, specifically epistemology and philosophy 
of science, as a kind of transformer or mediator. Epistemology and philosophy of science 
were needed to identify and distinguish between the different kinds of knowledge 
provided by theology and the social sciences. 
     How successful Jesuits (or others) have been in linking the social sciences and 
theology so as to produce something substantially new in the forty years since GC 32 is 
unclear. Today, the verdict would probably be that it has not yet been achieved. In 
economics, Jesuits have not been immune to the temptation to escape into anti-
                                               
23 GC 32, n. 156; in Padberg 2009, p. 326. 
24 Francisco Ivern SJ, ‘The Future of Faith and Justice: A Critical Review of Decree 
Four’. Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits 14/5, pp. 18-20 (1982). 
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intellectual populism as response to globalization and the collapse of communism. Jesuits 
who became sociologists often seemed philosophically underdeveloped, unable to think 
their way through the positivistic limitations of traditional sociology.  
     Matters became worse later. From the 1980s onwards, the seductive attractions of 
post-modernism influenced many Jesuits, in theology, philosophy, and sociology, far 
more than was healthy for the Society of Jesus’s intellectual and theological 
commitments. It was one thing to shift emphasis from ontology to epistemology; it was 
quite another to abandon metaphysics or to regard truth and objectivity as mere cultural 
tools for Western hegemonistic oppression. 
 
CLASHING EPISTEMOLOGIES 
The second reason that GC 32 was so momentous was that it revealed, and also 
exacerbated, rising tensions between Pope Paul VI and the Society of Jesus. Those 
tensions later reached crisis point under Pope John Paul II in 1980-81. I suggest that the 
tensions can be viewed interestingly from the prism of conflicting epistemologies.   
     Pope Paul VI’s opening address to the Jesuits assembled to commence the General 
Congregation was lengthy and serious. One expects popes to admonish, or at least 
suggest reforms, when they officially register the fact that the Jesuits are convening a 
General Congregation, the equivalent of a general chapter for other religious orders. But 
this time there seemed to be more involved. The pope expressed his sense that the Jesuits 
no longer knew who or what they were. He invited them to reflect on the questions 
‘Where do you come from?’, ‘Who are you?’, and ‘Where are you going?’ and proceeded 
to give his own answers.25 To the first question, he recalled their history, and to the 
second he stated that they were religious, priests, apostles, and united with the pope 
through the special vow of obedience to the pope.  
     Much of what he said was laudatory of Jesuit achievements, and he praised their 
willingness to engage in intellectual ministry: ‘Wherever in the Church, even in the most 
difficult and most extreme fields, in the crossroads of ideologies, in the front line of 
social conflict, there has been and there is confrontation between the deepest desires of 
                                               
25 Padberg 2009, pp. 380ff. 
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man and the perennial message of the Gospel, there also there have been, and there are, 
Jesuits.’26 This was praise indeed, but many Jesuits differed profoundly from the pope 
with respect to what was involved in Jesuit encounters with others at the ideological 
crossroads. Where the Jesuits might have thought dialogue and learning was the goal, the 
pope had something else in mind. 
     For he then demanded: ‘And why then do you doubt?’ He told them that the doubts 
they experienced were precisely what was to be experienced in a world hostile to God, 
and complained: ‘You are as well aware as we are that today there appears within certain 
sectors of your ranks a strong state of uncertainty, indeed a fundamental questioning of 
your very identity …What is the state of acceptance and loyal witness in regard to the 
fundamental points of Catholic faith and moral teaching as set forth by the ecclesiastical 
magisterium?’ He went on to criticize a desire for novelty for its own sake that he 
detected in the Society of Jesus, and among other things urged the Jesuits to be more 
discerning between the demands of the world and those of the Gospel.27 
     Of interest here are the charges of doubt, uncertainty, and the apparent pursuit of 
novelty for its own sake. While linked to loss of faith, as well as to a kind of moral 
weakness, they also imply a kind of epistemological failure: a loss of intellectual nerve 
and conviction through being too open-minded to the world. 
     At the time, many Jesuits viewed Paul VI and his advisers as intellectually timorous 
and closed. They saw the pope as taking Vatican II to be a point of terminus, with the 
remaining task for the Church to be reception of the council’s decrees, whereas they, as 
progressive Jesuits, saw Vatican II as a point of departure in a radically changing world. 
They wanted more openness to the global range of cultures and ideologies, while the 
pope insisted that there was little point to being open to other positions if one no longer 
understood one’s own position. 
     Which view was correct? Perhaps both, depending on one’s angle of perception. Some 
of the pope’s more excitable advisors probably thought that heresy was rife among the 
Jesuits, but even they knew that formal heresy would have been hard to identify, let alone 
to prove. There was quite a diversity of socio-political views among Jesuits, although the 
                                               
26 Padberg 2009, p. 384. 
27 Padberg 2009, pp. 384, 385, and 388. 
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overall balance was more ‘left-wing’ than was the case among the pope’s advisors. But 
focusing on this is sterile. While a few Jesuits rejected some Church teachings, the typical 
Jesuit was not heretical, and didn’t think that a firm reaffirmation of dogma was the most 
important thing needed.  
     Bernard Lonergan’s tri-partite structure of cognition seems a useful metaphor here to 
image the divergence at GC 32. The Jesuits felt that the Church, of which they were a 
microcosm, was still at the level of seeking insight and understanding, by trying to read 
experience in new ways and by widening the scope of what was to count as experience, 
and by seeking to think ‘outside the box’ without being constricted in a slightly uncritical 
and even fearful way by focusing on dogma. The pope believed the range of possible 
understandings and interpretations of the world and human experience that had emerged 
in the previous decades was rich enough for the present, and that, at least with respect to 
Jesuit identity, the stage of judgment had been reached, where specific propositions had 
to be affirmed as true and other options excluded. No wonder there was a clash. I suggest 
that the clash was not doctrinal or ontological (i.e. about how things are, or about what 
propositions are to be affirmed and held as true) but epistemological: are we doing our 
knowing well? The Jesuits could have defended themselves by saying that no doctrines 
were being challenged by the Society of Jesus as a whole. Paul VI could have retorted 
that understandings that never moved to judgment were epistemologically sterile. 
     On this front, the dialectic continues. Subsequent decades have been less tumultuous 
than were the 1970s, the Jesuits have dwindled in numbers, and gradually a wary modus 
vivendi was reached between later popes and the Jesuits. Pope Francis, the first Jesuit 
pope, has repeatedly affirmed appreciation of cultural diversity and the epistemological 
emphasis that sees the importance of listening and being willing to aim for new 
insights.28 The Catholic Church has come a long way since the time of Pius X (1903-14) 
                                               
28 In his homily at the Gesu church in Rome on January 3, 2014, the pope remarked: ‘to be 
a Jesuit means to be a person of incomplete thought, of open thought: because one always 
thinks looking at the horizon which is the ever greater glory of God, who ceaselessly 
surprises us. And this is the restlessness of our void, this holy and beautiful restlessness! 
However, because we are sinners, we can ask ourselves if our heart has kept the 
restlessness of the search or if, instead, it has atrophied.’ See 
http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/pope-francis-homily-at-mass-in-the-church-of-the-gesu 
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when the anti-Modernist movement had become a veritable witch-hunt within the church, 
hunting down any intellectual originality in theology or philosophy even when oriented to 
orthodox ends. 
     On the other hand, Paul VI’s challenge has yet to be fully received by the Society of 
Jesus.29 The Jesuits correctly grasped that knowing is culturally conditioned, and wanted 
to be open to and accommodate other perspectives. It would then have been easy to 
dismiss the pope as simply reasserting orthodoxy and demanding an end to creative 
rethinking in theology and ethics. However, the pope’s point can be read more charitably, 
as worried that cultural openness risked implicitly assuming that truth could never be 
reached from a particular perspective, since all perspectives are limited and constrained. 
But since all knowing is indeed perspectival, it follows that if truth is attainable it must be 
attainable from a particular perspective. Culture and perspective may be critically 
transcended, but cannot be escaped.  
      Furthermore, the pope’s address implied that to know how to go forward Jesuits 
needed to remember where they were coming from. If the knower forgets who she is, 
either losing her cultural and cognitive grounding or lacking critical awareness of her 
cultural presuppositions, she cannot know, since she cannot judge and hence cannot grasp 
truth and move, in informed faith, to action.30 The drive to inquire loses its moorings if its 
metaphysical grounding in the culturally-rooted embodied cognitive agent is forgotten.  
     Finally, the epistemological drive loses its purpose and creative tension if its 
metaphysical goals are considered impossible. Christian faith affirms that reality is 
intelligible, that its intelligibility is independent of human knowers and their cognitive 
constructs, and that it is knowable by human knowers. A post-modernist rejection of 
ontology, and a historicist or culturally relativist stance that excludes the possibility of 
truth, can only doom the Society of Jesus’s commitment to the intellectual apostolate, 
since that commitment’s intelligibility assumes a coherent theology. The only option left 
                                               
29 John Paul II reiterated the challenge in Veritatis Splendor (1993) and Fides et Ratio 
(1998). 
30 Not every judgment succeeds in arriving at the truth; truth is hard to come by. The 
point is that if the real is merely conceptual, there is nothing for judgment to grasp, 
nothing about which it can say ‘it is thus-and-so’; and without judgment, epistemology 
degenerates into non-normative cultural studies. 
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will be some kind of ‘retreat to commitment’, i.e. to a practical activism chasing an 
elusive relevance.31 
     Philosophically, the implication was unavoidable: banishing metaphysics (along with 
the possibility of truth-claims) meant the death of epistemology. Metaphysics that 
foreclosed on epistemology meant a dogmatic sclerosis; epistemology that excluded 
metaphysics quickly becomes pointless. The Jesuits and the pope needed each other. 
      
CULTURE AND THEOLOGY 
In GC 34 (1995) the Jesuits addressed culture. This widened GC 31’s focus on atheism 
and shifted the angle of perception of GC 32’s theme of justice. There is thus a kind of 
natural evolution in thought at work here, since the decrees of any Jesuit general 
congregation reflect the reception of the decrees of previous general congregations. In 
this instance, the work of Jesuits of inculturating the gospel in Asia and Africa was 
bearing fruit. In addition, the creative contributions of such notable students of culture as 
American Jesuit Walter Ong (1912-2003) and French Jesuit Michel de Certeau (1925-86) 
played a significant role. The harvest of the explorations of ways of knowing involved in 
the diversified Jesuit outreach to culture was rich. 
     However, GC 34’s document on culture shows hesitant uneasiness and intellectual 
softness. On the one hand, it wished to express openness to those cultures where 
Christianity had never put down deep roots, particularly in Asia and Africa. On the other, 
it saw the importance of taking a critical stance towards various aspects of contemporary 
(particularly Western) cultures. But it did not succeed in harmonizing these two 
perspectives. The insights of H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (1951) portraying 
the different ways Christ is related to culture, whether in antagonism, affirmation, 
                                               
31 This is not a criticism of Jesuit social, spiritual, or pastoral ministries. The point is that 
if the Society of Jesus drifted into thinking its intellectual engagements in theology, 
philosophy and the sciences had little value (apart from an instrumental value of 
providing teachers in Jesuit universities for undergraduates) it would indicate a profound 
loss in the Society’s sense of what it means to hear and communicate the word of God. 
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transcendence, or transformation, seemed forgotten at GC 34.32 The critical intellectual 
edge the Jesuits had traditionally displayed seemed blunted.  
     To speak of this as a Jesuit intellectual crisis would be an exaggeration. It is more an 
indicator of a kind of uncertainty, a continuing intellectual hesitation in the Society of 
Jesus.33 A few years earlier, around 1989, the bicentennial of the French Revolution, 
communism in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe had collapsed. The age of ideology, 
as the early 20th century had been called, seemed over. The radically relativist disciples of 
Kuhn and Feyerabend, the pragmatist disciples of Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo, as 
well as the nihilistic thinkers in post-modernist thought, had moved in a direction of 
rejecting truth and objectivity as Western cultural tools of oppression.34 While these 
figures were a minority among philosophers, they were remarkably influential, joining up 
with and reinforcing wider post-modernist culture.35  
 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
At GC 34, it also seemed that the great intellectual projects that Vatican II had put on the 
table seemed to be yesterday’s agenda, not in the sense that the Jesuits no longer believed 
in them but in the sense that the intellectual excitement and challenge involved had worn 
off. 
     Those projects were, and necessarily had to be, theological in nature. They were not 
primarily about scriptural theology, since Catholic scripture scholars had caught up with 
                                               
32 Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) is more coherent in dealing with evangelization 
and culture than is GC 34’s decree on culture. At one point the latter even suggested that 
cultures had rights, oblivious of that claim’s implications for adopting a critical stance 
towards cultures; see GC 34, n. 112, in Padberg 2009, pp. 544-545. 
33 A landmark book is Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious 
Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1997). It reflects both success and ambiguity in 
contemporary Jesuit engagement with religious and cultural plurality. 
34 One well-known Indian Jesuit, influential as a retreat-giver and writer on spirituality, 
would regularly dismiss objections to his claims as products of a “Western logic” and 
hence lacking in rational cogency or force. 
35 For a thoughtful Jesuit pastoral response, see Michael Paul Gallagher, Clashing 
Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture (Paulist, 2003). A collection of papers 
that reflects post-modernist influence in the Jesuit world is Francis X. Clooney, ed, Jesuit 
Postmodern: Scholarship, Vocation, and Identity in the 21st Century (Lanham: 
Lexington, 2006). 
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their Protestant counterparts and there was little controversy around Scripture in post-
Vatican II years. Significant difficulties emerged in moral theology after Vatican II and 
became sharper after 1980, reaching an impasse around 2000: ‘liberal’ moral theology 
seemed too epistemologically shallow, while the conservative ‘restorationist’ project 
(encouraged by John Paul II) was too dominated by a tacit desire for an anti-
epistemological stasis and doctrinal inertia. Help could only come from outside and that 
depended on a revitalized systematic theology. 
     In the 1930-80 period, there were major strides in Catholic systematic theology, 
through Jesuits Karl Rahner, Henri de Lubac, and Avery Dulles, ex-Jesuit Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, diocesan priest Joseph Ratzinger, and Dominicans Yves Congar and Marie-
Dominique Chenu. The break-through for these theological modernizers came in Vatican 
II and what it made possible. The legacy of these theologians continues to influence. But 
most had faded from the scene by the 1980s, some unhappy at post-conciliar 
developments. They had made a revolution, probably to their surprise, but were not so 
clear as to what was to come afterwards. They were creative, innovative, and 
illuminating, but their work was also defined by its relation to pre-Vatican II theology 
and Thomistic scholasticism. With that older world swept away, as it rapidly was after 
the mid-1960s, the significance and influence of their work faded. 
     In the third millennium, with Vatican II already a half-century in the past, and its 
battles largely historical now, a revitalized systematic theology is needed in the Catholic 
Church, if such groups as the Society of Jesus are to regain their intellectual élan. The 
Jesuits, like the Dominicans and a few other groups, are among those to whom the 
Church looks to make such renewal possible.  
     I content myself here with drawing attention to Jesuit commitment to knowledge, and 
to the epistemological tasks involved in acquiring knowledge. There are two principal 
epistemological modes: critical and constructive. In the lead up to Vatican II, critical 
thought was needed, involving a willingness to listen to those outside the Church and a 
desire to rethink and develop Church doctrines in ways that eschewed easy answers. In 
that mode, historically we can see the Jesuit epistemological contribution as critical, 
placing distance between our ways of knowing, in all their cultural and contextual 
diversity, and any systematic metaphysics that went beyond a vaguely general 
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Weltanschauung. The other mode is constructive, and its goal is to be productive, to 
midwife (as Socrates ambitioned) a metaphysic and an anthropology that is rich in 
Christian thought, intuition, faith, and experience of practical love. If the critical mode 
then required breaking the chains of a rigid and ossified conceptual system that passes for 
orthodoxy, the constructive mode today will have to express itself in resisting the 
enervating post-modernist sensibility that is skeptical of truth, anti-metaphysics, and 
fearful of intellectual boldness. It is an essential service that Jesuits, who work in 
epistemology, the sciences, or cultural studies, must offer if systematic theology is to 
flower in our time. 
 
